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REMEDYING THE CONFUSION BETWEEN
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND
STATUTES OF REPOSE IN WISCONSIN-A
CONCEPTUAL GUIDE
DANIEL J. LA FAVE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In its 2001 decision in Landis v. Physicians Insurance Co. of
Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Supreme Court lamented that "the terms
'statute of repose' and 'statute of limitations' have long been two of the
most confusing and interchangeably used terms in the law."' The court
went a long way towards remedying this confusion in Wenke v. Gehl
Co., a decision issued at the end of the 2003-04 term.2 There'the court
finally laid to rest any doubt over the intended meaning of the oft-
quoted statement from its 1944 decision in Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Beleznay, that "in Wisconsin, limitations are not treated as statutes of
repose."3 As the court recognized in Wenke, by reading this phrase out
of context, Wisconsin courts previously had attributed to Maryland a
contemporary distinction between time limits that operate, or are
triggered, in two fundamentally different ways, namely statutes of
limitation (accrual or injury driven) and statutes of repose (keyed to a
specified event). In reality, no such distinction was intended in
Maryland.4 Rather, when understood in its proper historical context,
Maryland serves to underscore a bedrock principle of Wisconsin law
dating back to 1860; one that Wenke reaffirms: The effect of the running
of any statutory time limit for commencing an action, however it might
be denominated, is to create a vested right to immunity in the party
* Partner, Product Liability and Litigation Groups, Quarles & Brady LLP. John Henry
Wigmore Scholar, Northwestern University School of Law, J.D., 1992, cum laude, Order of
the Coif. Mr. La Fave authored the defense's briefs in both Merner v. Deere & Co. and
Wenke v. Gehl Co. and argued the cases before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and
Wisconsin Supreme Court, respectively.
1. 2001 WI 86, 1 61 n.16, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893.
2. 2004 WI 103,274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.
3. 245 Wis. 390, 393, 14 N.W.2d 177, 179 (1944).
4. See Wenke, 2004 WI 103, 1 59.
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potentially subject to suit-a right that is constitutionally protected
While the court's analysis in Wenke does much to cure what is
arguably the single greatest source of confusion in this area of the law,
namely debunking the Maryland myth, it does not fully develop and
expose how the confusion arose. Nor does it offer any clear guidelines
to ensure that one does not misread one of the many decisions that
propagated the Maryland myth. Expanding upon Wenke, this Article
presents a conceptual model that delineates the operative distinction
between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose, clarifies how the
two terms have been used over the years in Wisconsin case law, and
provides practical guidelines to avoid future errors in this area.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY TERMINOLOGICAL DISTINCTION-WHAT
TRIGGERS THE RUNNING OF THE TIME LIMIT?
A statute of limitations specifies a time period for commencing suit
on a given claim that begins to run, or is triggered, when the cause of
action accrues, which is when a claimant "discovers" an injury.6 By
contrast, the time limit for bringing suit established by a statute of
repose is triggered by a specified event, such as the substantial
completion of an improvement to real property The critical difference
is that repose periods run and can expire regardless of whether an injury
has occurred or has been discovered.' Potential plaintiffs can be as
diligent as possible in prosecuting their claims and still find them time
barred by the running of a repose period. In effect, through a repose
period, "the legislature has already determined when the claim
'accrues'-at the time of the defendant's action."9 By determining how
a particular time limit is triggered (i.e., by injury, actual or discovered,
or by a specified event) one can confidently and consistently distinguish
between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose, as those terms
currently are used. This conceptual difference, which Wenke
characterizes as an "operational distinction,"1 will be referred to herein
5. Id. 57.
6. Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 82, 237 Wis. 2d 99,
613 N.W.2d 849; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (7th ed. 1999).
7. Aicher, 2000 WI 98, 1 26; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 1423;
Wis. Stat. § 893.89 (2003-04) (ten-year repose period on action for injury resulting from
improvements to real property).
8. Aicher, 2000 WI 98, 1 26.
9. Kain v. Bluemound E. Indus. Park, Inc., 2001 WI App 230, T[ 14, 248 Wis. 2d 172, 635
N.W.2d 640 (citing Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 254, 578 N.W.2d 166,173 (1998)).
10. 2004 WI 103, 50, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.
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as the "trigger distinction."
Understanding what triggers a given statutory time limit is a critical
step in assessing the viability of any cause of action. Whether one is
prosecuting or defending a claim, it is vital to know when the clock on
the prescribed period began to run. Otherwise, one may devote
substantial resources to litigating a dispute only to find that the action is
untimely. A ready illustration of how things can go awry can be found
in Tomczak v. Bailey." There, the Wisconsin Supreme Court dismissed
a negligence action brought by landowners based upon an errant land
survey as being barred by the six-year repose period prescribed for such
actions. 2 In doing so, the court held that repose periods are not subject
to the common law discovery rule adopted in Hansen v. A.H. Robins,
Inc. (i.e., tort claims accrue on the date the injury is discovered or with
reasonable diligence should be discovered, whichever occurs first). 3
The court explained that, consistent with Hansen, Wisconsin's
legislature could specify limited discovery rules as part of a given
limitations period or "choose to employ no discovery rule at all.' 4 All
in all, as Tomczak illustrates, statutes of repose tend to be less forgiving
than traditional statutes of limitation.
The first reported Wisconsin case in which the phrase "statute of
repose" was used to convey the trigger distinction is the supreme court's
1989 decision in Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equipment, Inc." Yet even then,
it was not a phrase that the court itself employed. Rather, it appears in
an excerpt taken from the Alaska Supreme Court's discussion of the
constitutionality of a time limit for claims based upon improvements to
real property, which was at issue in Funk.6 However, the Funk court
inexplicably failed to include the concise contemporary definitional
distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose found
elsewhere in the Alaska case. 7 Instead, the Funk court characterized
the Wisconsin counterpart, section 893.89 of the Wisconsin Statutes, as
11. 218 Wis. 2d 245, 578 N.W.2d 166 (1998).
12. Id.
13. 113 Wis. 2d 550, 560, 335 N.W.2d 578, 583 (1983); Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 259, 578
N.W.2d at 173 ("We hold that the judicially-created Hansen discovery rule cannot be applied
to a statute of repose.").
14. Tomczak, 218 Wis. 2d at 258, 578 N.W.2d at 172.
15. 148 Wis. 2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989); see also Wenke, 2004 WI 103, 41 n.22 ("In
Castellani v. Bailey we stated that, if anything, a claim subject to a statute of repose limitation
period 'accrues' on the date of the primary conduct triggering the limitation period occurs.").
16. See Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 75-76, 435 N.W.2d at 251 (quoting Turner Constr. Co. v.
Scales, 752 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Alaska 1988)).
17. Turner, 752 P.2d at 469 n.2.
2005]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
an "immunity statute," even though it was "presented by the legislature
as a statute of limitations.1 8 The court remarked that while there was a
"facade of ordinariness" about the statute:
Examination of [it] reveals that it is anything but ordinary. It
limits actions in a manner unrelated to "accrual" of a cause of
action or the sustaining of injury or damages. Under this statute,
an action may be barred before the injury is ever sustained or
before any right to bring suit arises.19
Because of this "uniqueness," the court felt that this "unusual statute"
required careful examination." Ultimately, the court concluded that it
was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because the
legislature failed to provide adequate justification for excluding
property owners and certain others from the protected class of
individuals.21
Shortly after Funk, in Leverence v. United States Fidelity &
Guaranty,22 the court of appeals employed the modern definitions
underlying the trigger distinction in finding that the phrase "period of
limitation" as used in Wisconsin's borrowing statute, section 893.07,
applies to only statutes of limitations and not statutes of repose. In
doing so, the court of appeals borrowed wholesale the definitions given
by the Seventh Circuit in its 1987 decision in Beard v. J.L Case Co.,23
which also involved interpretation of the borrowing statute.24 Notably,
Beard provided no citation to Wisconsin authority (or any authority for
that matter) for the terminological distinction.
Before proceeding, it bears emphasizing a point made in Funk,
namely that the "special interest immunity statute," as the court labeled
it, had been presented by the legislature as an ordinary "statute of
limitations., 21 In Landis, the supreme court took pains to note that the
legislature never has employed the phrase "statute of repose" or
18. Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 71, 435 N.W.2d at 249 (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 71-72, 435 N.W.2d at 249-50.
21. Id. at 77, 435 N.W.2d at 252.
22. 158 Wis. 2d 64, 462 N.W.2d 218 (Ct. App. 1990).
23. 823 F.2d 1095 (7th Cir. 1987).
24. Leverence, 158 Wis. 2d at 92, 462 N.W.2d at 230 (quoting Beard, 823 F.2d at 1097
25. Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 71, 74, 435 N.W.2d at 249, 251.
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"repose" in any statute.26 Instead, the legislature uses phrases such as
"period of limitation," ''time limitation,' ''statute of limitation," and
"law limiting the time for commencement of an action."27 The Landis
court explained that the term "'statute of repose' is largely a judicial
label for a particular type of limitation on actions," and "is not featured
in legislative lingo."29 Consequently, the court held that when, as part of
the 1983-84 session, the legislature enacted section 655.44, a medical
malpractice tolling statute, it intended the phrase "[a]ny applicable
statute of limitations" to include and toll "any applicable statute of
repose."' °  That included the five-year repose period for medical
malpractice actions that the legislature enacted during the 1979-80
session as part of section 893.55.31
III. THE SOURCE OF CONFUSION-EARLIER DECISIONS USING
"STATUTE OF REPOSE" TO CONVEY SOMETHING OTHER THAN THE
TRIGGER DISTINCTION
The first time the phrase "statute of repose" appears in any reported
Wisconsin decision is in the 1853 case of Pritchard v. Howell.32
However, at the outset of the opinion, the court stated, "[t]he only
question in this case arises under the statute of limitations."3 3 The case
involved an action on a promissory note and was commenced more than
six years after the note became due, which was the controlling
limitations period. In upholding judgment for the defendant based upon
the statutory bar, the court reasoned, "[s]ound policy, therefore,
requires that this law should be so administered, as to make it what it
was designed to be, 'a statute of repose."'3 How could this be, since
Wisconsin did not formally recognize the trigger distinction until the
court of appeals' 1990 decision in Leverence? The answer is
straightforward. The court was not attempting to distinguish between
26. 2001 WI 86, 61,245 Wis. 2d 1,628 N.W.2d 893.
27. Id. 61 & n.15.
28. Id. 15.
29. Id. 61; see also id. 60 n.13 ("While the concept of a statute of repose may have
been part of the 'legal lexicon' for more than a century, it has never been part of the
legislative lingo in this state.").
30. Id. 5; see also id. 59 n.ll (noting that phrase originated in Wis. Stat. § 655.44(6)
(1983-84)).
31. Id.; see also id. T 47.
32. 1 Wis. 131 (1853).
33. Id. at 134 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 138 (emphasis added).
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two fundamentally different types of time limits. Rather, the court was
describing one of the widely recognized purposes behind statutes of
limitation, to give rest (or repose) to litigation.
As the supreme court subsequently observed in its 1879 decision in
Oconto Co. v. Jerrard," "[i]t is therefore the policy of the law that some
reasonable lapse of time should end all controversies .... This is the
philosophy of statutes of limitation. They are therefore called 'statutes
of repose.' They give possession rest from litigation. 3 6 The use of the
phrase "statute of repose" to convey the concept of giving rest to
litigation after a specified period of time will be referred to as the "rest
distinction." That distinction applies with equal force to any statute that
establishes a time limit for bringing a claim, regardless of how it is
denominated."
The supreme court did not use the phrase "statute of repose" to
convey anything but the rest distinction until its 1921 decision in In re
Hoya's Will.38  Among the issues presented there was whether an
executor, upon his assuming to act in that capacity, could be charged
with debts he owed his mother's estate for which the statute of
limitations had run at the time of her death.39 The court recognized the
general rule that such a person becomes chargeable with his existing
obligations to the estate he undertakes to administer. However, there
was a split in authority as to whether the same rule applied to
obligations against which a statute of limitations had run during the
testator's life. In relating this split in authority, the court stated the
following:
The general line of authorities holding that the statute of
limitations does not bar the application of such general rule is
held in those jurisdictions wherein the statute of limitations is
considered merely a statute of repose applying to the remedy only,
while the contrary view is maintained where it is considered that
the statute of limitations destroys the right of action itself and gives
rise to a new property right in the debtor. This latter view as to
the statute of limitations has been repeatedly asserted by this
35. 46 Wis. 317, 50 N.W. 591 (1879).
36. Id. at 326, 50 N.W. at 594.
37. See Aicher, 2000 WI 98, 27, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 ("Statutes of limitation
and statutes of repose represent legislative policy decisions that dictate when the courthouse
doors close for particular litigants.").
38. 173 Wis. 196, 180 N.W. 940 (1921).
39. Id. at 198, 180 N.W. at 943.
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court, although such view is deemed to be contrary to that of
many of the sister states and of the United States Supreme
Court.4
Consistent with its longstanding adherence to the vested right approach,
the Hoya court held that an obligation that was time barred at the
testator's death was not to be charged against the son when he assumed
the duties as executor of his mother's estate41
The Hoya court's distinction between those jurisdictions in which
the effect of the running of a time limit was deemed to be solely a
remedial bar and those, like Wisconsin, where it extinguished the claim
and created a new property right in the potential defendant will be
referred to herein as the "right/remedy distinction." The significance of
this distinction is that under the vested rights approach, a legislature
cannot constitutionally make a retroactive change in the time limit that
governs a given claim once the period has run, whereas in remedy-only
jurisdictions it can.4 2
Although not discussed in Hoya, the Wisconsin Supreme Court first
adopted the vested right approach to the running of a limitations period
in 1860 in Sprecher v. Wakeley.43 As the preceding excerpt from Hoya
indicates, the competing remedial-bar-only school of thought was led by
none other than the United States Supreme Court, whose leading case
on the subject was its 1885 post-Sprecher decision in Campbell v. Holt."
In its 1889 decision in Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 5 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court made clear that, notwithstanding Campbell, it was
adhering to the vested rights approach. The court believed that the
dissent in Campbell had the better argument and remarked that it
40. Id. at 198, 180 N.W. at 944 (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., State v. Haines, 2003 WI 39, 13, 262 Wis. 2d 139, 661 N.W.2d 72 ("We
have concluded that 'once a statute of limitations has run, the party relying on the statute has
a vested property right in the statute-of-limitations defense, and new law which changes the
period of limitations cannot be applied retroactively to extinguish that right."') (quoting
Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis. 2d 397,416, 388 N.W.2d 140, 148 (1986)); see also Betthauser
v. Med. Protective Co., 172 Wis. 2d 141, 147, 493 N.W.2d 40, 42 (1992) ("If... a statute is
procedural or remedial, rather than substantive, the statute is generally given retroactive
application unless retroactive application would impair contracts or disturb vested rights.").
43. 11 Wis. 432, 433 (1860) ("It is an error to suppose that a statute of limitations affects
the remedy only.... The statute of limitations is not only a bar to the remedy, but it takes
away the legal right.").
44. 115 U.S. 620 (1885).
45. 103 Wis. 373, 79 N.W. 433 (1899).
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"states the doctrine of this court on the subject with strict accuracy.""6
Wisconsin has adhered to that doctrine, without interruption, up to the
present. Indeed, the rule is codified in section 893.05.
The headwaters of the confusion in this area can be traced to the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's 1944 decision in Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Beleznay.' There, the court was called upon to determine whether the
defendant's liability on a surety bond had been discharged in
bankruptcy.49 In answering the question affirmatively, the court rejected
the argument that the exception to discharging liabilities under
bankruptcy law for "willful and malicious injuries" applied. The court
reasoned that no action could be maintained based upon such conduct
(e.g., a claim for conversion) because it would have been time barred
when the surety company commenced suit. In what has become a
frequently quoted passage, the Maryland court declared that:
In Wisconsin the running of the statute of limitations absolutely
extinguishes the cause of action for in Wisconsin limitations are
not treated as statutes of repose. The limitation of actions is a
right as well as a remedy, extinguishing the right on one side and
creating a right on the other, which is as of high dignity as
regards judicial remedies as any other right and it is a right which
enjoys constitutional protection.'
The mischievous error was to omit the word "merely" from the
right/remedy distinction as the court had expressed it in Hoya (i.e., in
Wisconsin, limitations are not treated merely as statutes of repose that
simply give rise to a remedial bar).
Until Landis was decided in 2001, there was only one reported
Wisconsin decision in which the court applied the right/remedy
distinction in a way that hearkened back to the manner in which it had
been expressed in Hoya (i.e., accurately). In its 1999 decision in
Strassman v. Muranyi,5' the court of appeals held that the plaintiff could
not rely on the timely commencement of a third-party action to toll the
46. Id. at 375, 79 N.W. at 435.
47. See, e.g., Betthauser, 172 Wis. 2d at 147-48 & n.5, 493 N.W.2d at 42 & n.5 (pointing
out its continued philosophical disagreement with the United States Supreme Court and
other remedial bar only jurisdictions).
48. 245 Wis. 390, 14 N.W.2d 177 (1944).
49. Id. at 392-93, 14 N.W.2d at 178.
50. Id. at 393, 14 N.W.2d at 179 (emphasis added).
51. 225 Wis. 2d 784, 594 N.W.2d 398 (1999).
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running of the three-year personal injury limitations period to assert her
own claim against the same third-party. In rejecting the plaintiff's
argument equating notice of litigation with tolling, the Muranyi court
reasoned, "[s]tatutes of limitations serve a much different purpose than
simply providing notice and repose."52 The court then quoted a prior
decision regarding "the effect [the running of a] statute of limitations
ha[s] on a claim" that, in turn, recycled the notorious quote from
Maryland in its entirety. 3
Maryland's subtle variation on the right/remedy distinction has
proliferated . It did not wreak havoc, though, until after 1989, when
courts began taking it (or cases that had recycled it) out of context to
address the trigger distinction.
IV. COMPOUNDING THE ERROR AND PROPAGATING
THE MARYLAND MYTH
Leverence constitutes the first instance in which a Wisconsin
appellate court fundamentally misapplied Maryland's right/remedy
distinction. The court of appeals concluded, based upon Maryland's
1944 statement, that "in Wisconsin limitations are not treated as statutes
of repose" read using Beard's 1987 trigger distinction definitions, that
the plain meaning of the borrowing statute excluded statutes of repose.5
Section 893.07 "refers to a period of limitation, not a period of repose. 56
Conceptually, by using right/remedy distinction authority to develop
a trigger distinction analysis, the court of appeals was mixing apples with
bananas. The only way that Maryland's right/remedy distinction might
conceivably provide support is if the effect of the running of a statute of
repose gave rise solely to a remedial bar. Yet that never has been the
case in Wisconsin.
On two occasions prior to the supreme court's decision in Wenke,
52. Id. at 792, 594 N.W.2d at 402 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 792-93, 594 N.W.2d at 402-03 (quoting Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 140 Wis. 2d 80, 85, 410 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Ct. App. 1987), affd, 144 Wis. 2d 352, 424
N.W.2d 191 (1988) (quoting Maryland, 245 Wis. at 383, 14 N.W.2d at 179)).
54. See, e.g., Pulchinski v. Strnad, 88 Wis. 2d 423, 428, 276 N.W.2d 781, 789 (1979) (citing
Haase v. Sawicki, 20 Wis. 2d 308, 311, 121 N.W.2d 876, 878 (1963) (quoting Maryland, 245
Wis. at 393, 14 N.W.2d at 179)).
55. See Leverence v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty, 158 Wis. 2d 64, 91-93, 462 N.W.2d 218,
230 (Ct. App. 1990). The operative portion of the borrowing statute reads, "If an action is
brought in this state on a foreign cause of action and the foreign period of limitation which
applies has expired, no action may be maintained in this state." WIS. STAT. § 893.07(1)
(2003-04).
56. Leverence, 158 Wis. 2d at 93, 462 N.W.2d at 231.
2005]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Wisconsin appellate courts had observed that the running of a repose
period "extinguishes the cause of action," just as the running of a statute
of limitations does. In Hartland-Richmond Town Insurance Co. v.
Wudtke,57 decided by the court of appeals two years before Leverence,
the court found that once the six-year limitations period in the
improvement to real property statute had run, "Hartland-Richmond's
'right' was extinguished."58 It should not be surprising that the court of
appeals repeatedly referred to section 893.89 as a "limitations period" or
a "statute of limitations" (although it is unquestionably a repose period)
because neither the trigger distinction found in Leverence nor Funk's
"special interest immunity statute" judicial labels had yet been
developed. 9
The second pre-Wenke instance in which a Wisconsin appellate court
commented on the effect of the running of a repose period was the
supreme court's 2000 decision in Aicher ex rel. LaBarge v. Wisconsin
Patients Compensation Fund.6°  There, the court upheld the
constitutionality of the repose periods that govern medical malpractice
actions involving minors. The court found that when they ran, they
"extinguish[ed] [the] cause of action."6 The court made clear that their
running extinguished the remedies too.
62
Hartland-Richmand's and Aicher's recognition that the running of a
repose period extinguishes the right to bring an action (assuming it has
not been prevented from vesting before an injury accrues) is in keeping
with the approach in the majority of jurisdictions-a point highlighted
by the court in Wenke.63 Indeed, even jurisdictions that follow the
remedy-only approach embodied by Campbell for statutes of limitation
treat the running of a repose period as "extinguish[ing] both the right
and the remedy."'  In brief, the vested substantive right rule from
57. 145 Wis. 2d 682, 429 N.W.2d 496 (Ct. App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by
Funk, 148 Wis. 2d 59.
58. Id. at 693, 429 N.W.2d at 500 (citing Maryland, 245 Wis. at 394, 14 N.W.2d at 170).
The supreme court overruled Hartland-Richmond on other grounds when it found the statute
to be unconstitutional the following year in Funk. Funk, 148 Wis. 2d at 68, 77.
59. See Hartland-Richmond, 145 Wis. 2d at 691, 693, 45 N.W.2d at 248, 252.
60. 2000 WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.
61. Id. 83.
62. Id. 50 ("The effect of extinguishing a remedy in court is the same." (emphasis
added)).
63. 2004 WI 103, 57-58, 274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.
64. Via v. GE, 799 F. Supp. 837, 839 (W.D. Tenn. 1992); accord 51 AM. JUR. 2D
Limitation of Actions § 32 (2000) ("While a statute of limitations generally is procedural and
extinguishes the remedy rather than the right, a statute of repose is substantive and
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Sprecher-Eingartner-Hoya-Maryland applies with equal force to the
running both of a statute of limitations and a statute of repose, as those
terms are now operationally differentiated under the trigger distinction.
V. DEBUNKING THE MARYLAND MYTH-
THE DEMISE OF LEVERENCE
After Landis was decided in 2001, Wisconsin courts gradually began
to debunk the Maryland myth. However, that process has been limited
to one context: correcting Leverence's conceptual error in interpreting
the borrowing statute.
The debunking process began in earnest in the Eastern District's
decision in Merner v. Deere & Co.6' There, the court was called upon to
determine whether Iowa's fifteen-year repose period for product
liability actions applied under the borrowing statute to preclude two
consolidated lawsuits brought by Iowa residents injured while refueling
old John Deere lawn tractors. The centerpiece of the plaintiffs'
argument in support of Leverence's interpretation of the borrowing
statute was a set of notes provided by the Wisconsin Judicial Council
Committee to sections 893.07 and 893.05, the latter of which, as
mentioned earlier, is a codification of the right/remedy distinction.
Notably, both of these statutes were enacted during the 1979-80 session
in the same piece of legislation. 66 The statutes, along with their notes,
read as follows:
extinguishes both the remedy and the actual action." (footnotes omitted)); see also Wenke,
2004 WI 103, $ 57 ("A clear majority of American courts have held that statutes of repose are
substantive, while statutes of limitation are ordinarily procedural in nature and affect only the
availability of a remedy for a litigant.").
65. 176 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Wis. 2001).
66. 1979 Wis. Laws 323, § 28.
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893.05. Relation of statute of limitations to right and remedy
When the period within which an action may be commenced on a
Wisconsin cause of action has expired, the right is extinguished
as well as the remedy.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE NOTE-1979
This new section is a codification of Wisconsin case law. See
Maryland Casualty Company v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390, 14
N.W.2d 177 (1944), in which it is stated at page 393: "In
Wisconsin the running of the statute of limitations absolutely
extinguishes the cause of action for in Wisconsin limitations are
not treated as statutes of repose."
893.07. Application of foreign statutes of limitation.
(1) If an action is brought in this state on a foreign cause of
action and the foreign period of limitation which applies has
expired, no action may be maintained in this state.
(2) If an action is brought in this state on a foreign cause of
action and the foreign period of limitation which applies to that
action has not expired, but the applicable Wisconsin period of
limitation has expired, no action may be maintained in this state.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE NOTE-1979
Subsection (1) applies the provision of s. 893.05 that the running
of a statute of limitations extinguishes the right as well as the
remedy to a foreign cause of action on which an action is
attempted to be brought in Wisconsin in a situation where the
foreign period has expired. Subsection (1) changes the law of
prior s. 893.205(1), which provided that a resident of Wisconsin
could sue in this state on a foreign cause of action to recover
damages for injury to the person even if the foreign period of
limitation had expired.
Subsection (2) applies the Wisconsin statute of limitations to a
foreign cause of action if the Wisconsin period is shorter than the
67foreign period and the Wisconsin period has run.
67. WIS. STAT. §§ 893.05,893.07 (2003-04) (emphasis added).
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Based on these notes, the plaintiffs in Merner argued that the
express purpose of section 893.07(1) was to apply Wisconsin's
"'longstanding judicial distinction between statutes of limitations and
statutes of repose applicable to foreign causes of action." ' 6' In rejecting
this argument, the court in Merner explained:
The judicial committee language only seems to suggest what
plaintiffs conclude. The purpose of Section 893.07(1) was not to
codify the "longstanding judicial distinction between statutes of
limitation and statutes of repose applicable to foreign causes of
action." Maryland Casualty is quoted in connection with §
893.05, which is titled "Relation of statute of limitations to right
and remedy," and this section codifies the concept that when
"the period within which an action may be commenced on a
Wisconsin cause of action has expired, the right is extinguished
as well as the remedy." § 893.05. Accordingly, when the Court
in Maryland Casualty held that "in Wisconsin limitations are not
treated as statutes of repose," this was not in the context of
addressing the distinction between a statute of limitations and a
statute of repose, a distinction which the Court addresses today.
Instead, it was cited as authority for the proposition that "the
limitation of actions is a right as well as a remedy, extinguishing
the right on one side and creating a right on the other."
Maryland Casualty, 14 N.W.2d at 179. Under Wisconsin law,
"statutes of limitation [are viewed as] substantive statutes
because they create and destroy rights." Betthauser v. Medical
Protective Company, 172 Wis. 2d 141, 493 N.W.2d 40, 43 (1992).
The quote in Maryland Casualty is therefore taken out of
context.69
The Merner court reasoned that, given Landis, it would be
"'incomprehensible that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would find that
Wisconsin's legislature intended statutes of limitation to equal statutes
of repose in 1979 for one statute [(i.e., Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b), the
medical malpractice statute of repose)], but not another [namely the
borrowing statute]."'' ° Accordingly, the Merner court predicted that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court would not follow Leverence, but would
instead find that a repose period constitutes a "period of limitation"
68. Merner, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 888 (quoting Pl.'s Br.).
69. Id. at 888-89.
70. Id. at 888 (quoting Deere's Reply Br. at 6).
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under the borrowing statute.7'
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals continued the debunking of the
Maryland myth in its decision in Wenke, which affirmed the dismissal of
a lawsuit brought against Gehl Company arising out of a 1997 accident
involving a Gehl round baler, which had been sold to the initial
purchaser in 1981. In similarly finding that Iowa's fifteen-year repose
period barred the action by virtue of the borrowing statute, the court of
appeals adopted Merner's logic.72 In keeping with Merner's prediction,
the court of appeals concluded that Landis had implicitly overruled
Leverence.73
In affirming the court of appeals' decision in Wenke, the supreme
court conclusively completed the Maryland myth debunking process.
The court recognized that there had been two competing definitions of
the phrase "statute of repose" over the years. The "modern definition"
captures the "operational distinction" between the two types of
limitations periods (which has been referred to herein as the trigger
distinction).74 The court found that before the modern definition came
into vogue, the phrase "'statute of repose' was commonly used to refer
to general limitations periods that simply provided peace, or 'repose,' to
potential litigants, taking away the remedy for an otherwise valid
claim., 75 As to the purportedly decisive Judicial Council Committee
Notes, after tracing the historical uses of the phrase "statute of repose,"
the court found that:
The language from Maryland Casualty was actually expressing
that all Wisconsin limitations periods are more than merely
statutes providing "repose," because that kind of repose would
not be substantive in effect.
We have extensively reviewed Wisconsin cases that have
invoked the term "statute of repose" and conclude that its use at
the time of Maryland Casualty, which is the proper context of the
Committee Note to § 893.05, was merely to describe limitation
periods that apply only to bar an available remedy, not affect
substantive rights.... In all, the longstanding judicial distinction
between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose alluded to in
71. Id. at 888-90.
72. 2003 WI App 189, 21, 267 Wis. 2d 221, 669 N.W.2d 789, affd, 2004 WI 103, 274
Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.
73. Id. 24.
74. Wenke v. Gehl Co., 2004 WI 103, 1 50,274 Wis. 2d 220, 682 N.W.2d 405.
75. Id. 1 54.
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the Note to Wis. Stat. § 893.05 has nothing to do with how the
two concepts are differentiated today. Rather, it relates solely to
the effect of a limitation period-any limitation period-
expiring."
For the dissent in Wenke, the Committee's Note to section 893.05
was determinative. " However, the dissent inexplicably failed to address
two key points, which completely undermine its credibility. First, the
Judicial Council itself referred to other limitations periods included in
the 1979-80 legislation as statutes of limitation-even though the
supreme court has since labeled them as statutes of repose under what
the Wenke majority describes as the "modern definition" (i.e., the
trigger distinction).9 One must remember that until Leverence in 1990,
no Wisconsin appellate court had employed "statute of repose" to
connote the trigger distinction. To the contrary, when the supreme
court focused on the distinction in Funk in 1989, it recognized that the
legislature still considered such laws to be statutes of limitation. It was
an operational distinction that was present in Wisconsin law (e.g., the
negligent improvement to real estate provision involved in Funk), but
had not received a distinct definitional label-even though our courts
may have been aware that certain statutory time limits operated in an
"unusual" fashion when compared to the typical, accrual driven ones.
Second, the dissent failed to justify the incongruity between its position
in Wenke, and its 2001 concurrence in Landis. There, the same two
justices agreed, in construing the medical malpractice tolling provision
enacted during the 1983-84 session, that "the term 'statute of repose' is
not part of the legislature's lexicon, but rather is a judicially created
label used to describe a particular type of limitation on actions."' For
76. Id. 56 (footnotes omitted).
77. See id. [ 85 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("Although the majority attempts at length to
explain away this note, there is no escaping its clear mandate: Wisconsin's borrowing
statute ... was not intended by the legislature to apply to statutes of repose.").
78. See Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 255-66, 578 N.W.2d 166, 171 (1998) ("'The
4-year statute of limitation time period ... has been increased to 6 years.' (emphasis added))
(quoting Committee's Note to Section 893.07).
79. See Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equip., Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989); see
also Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 387-88, 225 N.W.2d 454, 457-58
(1975) (addressing, as in Funk, a constitutional challenge to the negligent improvement to
real property time limit, after quoting from a recent prior decision that had pointed out that
the statute could bar suit before the injury arises, the court commented, "[i]t seems, therefore,
that there is little rational justification for this statute in the traditional terms by which statutes
of limitations are judged" (emphasis added)).
80. Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 86, $ 67, 245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d
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these justices, the phrase was not part of the legislature's lexicon in
1983-84; therefore, one is left wondering how it could have been present
in the legislature's mind during the 1979-80 session-several years
earlier. The simple truth is this: the majority in Landis got it right.
Neither Wisconsin courts nor its legislature used the modern definition,
or trigger distinction, in discussing statutory time limits prior to 1990.
Indeed, to this day, the legislature does not employ that terminology in
crafting legislation.8'
VI. OTHER MANIFESTATIONS OF THE MARYLAND MYTH
While Wenke has once and for all brought an end to the Maryland
myth, it does not establish ready guidelines for avoiding confusion in
reading and applying earlier cases. Nor does it speak to the other
settings in which Wisconsin appellate decisions have attributed a trigger
distinction to Maryland and its progeny. One prominent example is in
Landis. While the supreme court concluded that the legislature never
had distinguished between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose,
the court "acknowledge[d] that [its] opinions have long regarded
statutes of limitation as different from statutes of repose. '" That simply
is not true. Each of the cases that Landis cited for this proposition
addressed the right/remedy distinction, as expressed in Maryland, and
nothing more. Yet as Wenke makes clear, that distinction does not
speak to operational differences between two different types of time
limits, but rather to Wisconsin's long-established treatment of the effect
of the running of any statutory time bar. Indeed, the most recent of the
three cases cited by Landis for this proposition is a 1979 decision that
pre-dates the formal judicial recognition in Wisconsin of the trigger
distinction by a decade.83 All of the authority Landis cites for this errant
proposition flows from the Maryland headspring.
The dissent in Landis similarly muddled things. In collecting
authority to support its claim that the modern concept of statute of
repose had been firmly imbedded in Wisconsin law for "over 100 years,"
893 (Bradley, J., concurring; joined by Abrahamson, C.J.).
81. During the 2003-04 legislative term, the senate considered enactment of what would
have been a fifteen-year repose period for product liability actions. Yet the proposed
legislation was titled simply as "TIME LIMIT." 2003 Senate Bill 126 (proposed new section
895.047(5); period to run from product's date of manufacture).
82. Landis, 2001 WI 86, 60 n.12 (citing Pulchinski, 88 Wis. 2d at 428, 276 N.W.2d at
783-84; Haase, 20 Wis. 2d at 311, 121 N.W.2d at 877; Maryland, 245 Wis. at 393, 14 N.W.2d at
179).
83. Id. (citing Pulchinski).
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the dissent asserted that Pritchard v. Howell involved a statute of
repose.8' However, as established earlier, that is in patent disregard of
how the Pritchard court itself had characterized the law in question. At
the outset of the opinion, the court expressly stated that it involved a
"statute of limitations. 85  The subsequent reference to "statute of
repose" was to convey nothing more than the rest distinction. The
dissent's reference to McMillan v. Wehle similarly fails to support the
proposition of an earlier recognition of the trigger distinction.'
Throughout McMillan, the court referred to the adverse possession time
limit involved as a "period of limitation." 8 As in Pritchard, the court's
one use of the phrase "statute of repose" was solely to convey the rest
distinction.89
A more recent example of the supreme court using the terms
interchangeably and in a haphazard manner can be found in its 2003
decision in Hamilton v. Hamilton.9° There, the court was called upon to
construe section 893.40, which sets a twenty-year limitations period for
bringing actions on a judgment. In describing the law, which became
effective July 1, 1980, the court stated that it "is different from its
predecessor, § 893.16(1) (1977), in another way. The new statute is a
statute of repose.... In this case, the 'act' that triggers the statute of
repose is the entry of the judgment." 91 Yet in the very next one-sentence
paragraph the court states, "[i]n short, § 893.40 is plain and
unambiguous in its declaration that the statute of limitations begins to
run upon the entry of judgment." 92
84. Id. 81 & n.10 (Crooks, J., dissenting).
85. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
86. 55 Wis. 685, 13 N.W. 694 (1882).
87. See Landis, 2001 WI 86, 81 (citing, inter alia, McMillan, 55 Wis. at 694, 13 N.W.
694) (Crooks, J., dissenting).
88. See, e.g., McMillan, 55 Wis. at 686, 13 N.W. at 696 ("The extent to which the period
of limitation was so shortened depended upon the time when such possession was taken under
it." (emphasis added)).
89. See id. at 687, 13 N.W. at 697 ("It is a statute of repose, giving perfect security to the
possessor, and terminating all inquiry on the part of any who might otherwise question his
title or disturb the possession.").
90. 2003 WI 50, 261 Wis. 2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832.
91. Id. 29 (emphasis added).
92. Id. 30 (emphasis added).
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VII. SOME PRACTICAL GUIDELINES TO AVOID PITFALLS
First, in analyzing statutes that bear upon the timeliness of an action,
one must begin with Landis's recognition that Wisconsin's legislature
has never employed the term "statute of repose." The senate's recent
consideration of a fifteen-year post-manufacture limit for product
liability actions suggests that the legislature continues to prefer other
labels for such laws. 93 To the extent that the legislature is presumed to
be aware of published decisions, certainly at no point prior to Funk in
1989 could it have intended to codify the modern definition/trigger
distinction-it had not yet been recognized in Wisconsin. Wisconsin's
appellate courts were only beginning to focus on the "unusual"
operational distinction of such laws and did not expressly adopt the
contemporary definitions of statutes of repose and statutes of limitations
until 1990 in Leverence. That is not to say that Wisconsin courts or
attorneys should ignore the operational distinction that may indeed be
present in laws pre-dating Funk and Leverence, just as the supreme
court excepted the negligent surveying repose period from the
judicially-created discovery rule in Hansen. However, nothing can turn
on the legislature having intended to impart a terminological distinction.
Indeed, based upon the senate's drafting efforts during the most recent
legislative session, one can persuasively argue that this precept
continues to hold true.
Second, any reference to a decision that pre-dates Leverence as
supporting the trigger distinction is in error. Even in Landis, where the
supreme court's attention was focused on the distinctions between
statutes of limitation and statutes of repose, both the majority and
dissenting opinions contain seeds of error on this point. Because of the
pervasive misuse of Maryland, it would be wise to read with
circumspection any pre-Wenke Wisconsin appellate decision that
purports to address distinctions between statutes of limitations and
statutes of repose.
Third, when dealing with a repose period, recognize that there are
no common-law exceptions to it. If there is no statutory exception, such
as the tolling provision in Landis, once the time limit has run the cause
of action is extinguished (if an injury has already occurred), or will be
prevented from accruing through the discovery of an injury.94 Once that
93. See supra note 81.
94. See Aicher ex reL LaBarge v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 98, 82, 237 Wis.
2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849 ("'If a statute of repose has run, no legally recognized cause of action
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has happened, there is no way to revive the claim. Only a prospective
defendant's waiver of its constitutionally protected vested right in the
statutory defense would enable the claimant to pursue relief in court.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In today's legal climate, where the trigger distinction has become a
critical feature in the law of timeliness of actions, it is vital that
Wisconsin courts and counsel take pains to distinguish between how the
terms statute of limitations and statute of repose have been used over
the years. As the fallout from Maryland illustrates, even a subtle shift in
phrasing can engender considerable confusion.
The preceding guidelines will help courts and advocates alike to
avoid error imbedded in cases prior to Wenke. The time period in which
a case was decided serves as a handy benchmark. If it pre-dates
Leverence, one can be confident that any reference it makes to a
"statute of repose" would not be to convey the trigger distinction, and
should not be used to develop arguments that turn on it. However, it
would be conceptually appropriate to use such cases to advance the
policies embodied in both the rest and right/remedy distinctions,
regardless of how a given time limit would be labeled today, because
these concepts apply across the board to all such laws.
Having conclusively debunked the Maryland myth, Wenke has taken
great strides in curing the confusion in this area of the law that the
supreme court recognized in Landis. Armed with a better appreciation
of the source of this confusion and how it has proliferated over the
years, as well as having practical guidelines on how to diagnose errant
decisions and avoid temporal miscues, as detailed above, one can hope
to lay to rest any lingering confusion in Wisconsin over statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose.
can accrue and, therefore, no right can vest."') (quoting Susan C. Randall, Due Process
Challenges to Statutes of Repose, 40 Sw. L.J. 997, 1007 (1986)).
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